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Abstract 
How do emerging powers cooperate at the global level? The government of India—one 
such power—has let it be known that it is seeking an enhanced role in global governance. 
Is Indian society ready for this new, global role? This paper analyses the impact of domestic 
factors on India’s foreign-policy ambitions. It begins by examining the country’s 
paradoxical social and economic development and the problems it faces in the realm of 
internal security. Section 2 looks at a number of socio-cultural and political factors that 
may help to explain India’s new, globally oriented approach to foreign policy: 1. Indian 
society’s capacity to merge tradition and modernity, resulting in the creation of resilient 
institutions; 2. the amorphous nature of Indian society and its distinctive capacity to 
exploit vagueness and improvisation in resolving problems; and 3. the competition and 
cooperation between political actors at national and federal level, which has resulted in 
the emergence of a functioning federal system but has also complicated centre–state 
relations. The paper concludes that, overall, the question of whether India’s social 
structures and political institutions are robust enough to allow it to assume a global role is 
not one that can be answered unambivalently. The government has undertaken major 
reforms and the country’s institutions are strong, resilient, adaptive, and keen on global 
cooperation. On the other hand, Indian society is still bedevilled by incoherent economic 
development in which phenomenal growth is found alongside appalling poverty and 
inequality. 
Keywords  
Conflict, development, domestic structures, economic growth, federalism, foreign 
policy, global governance, hybridity, India, internal security, poverty, socio-economic 
development, regionalism, resilient institutions, soft power, tradition and modernity 
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Abbreviations 
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party 
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa 
CPI Communist Party of India 
CPI (M) Communist Party of India (Marxist) 
DMK Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam  
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
G20 Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors  
(of 19 states and the European Union) 
GDP gross domestic product 
HCR head count ratio 
HDI Human Development Index 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IR Indian rupee 
NAM Non-Aligned Movement 
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NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty 
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Glossary 
 
babus bureaucrats 
Bharat Sanskrit name for India 
dalits tribals and people traditionally considered ‘untouchable’ 
danda  coercive authority  
dharma  common good 
dharna sitting and fasting on an offender’s doorstep  
garibi hatao  eradicate poverty 
gherao encirclement of politicians 
hindutva  Hindu nationalist ideology  
jugaad quick fix, a work around 
license raj  bureaucratic licensing system 
Naxalite member of Maoist militant group formed in the wake of  
a peasant revolt in the village of Naxalbari 
netas politicians  
sangh parivar  Hindu family 
satyagraha  non-violent resistance 
swadeshi autarky
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Is India Fit for a Role in Global Governance? 
The Predicament of Fragile Domestic Structures and 
Institutions  
Herbert Wulf 
Introduction 
The broker came here to procure the necessary certificates for 
 these men, in exchange for the necessary sums of money.  
With a smile and a hundred-rupee note, he invented  
legitimate occupations and respectable business  
offices for his clients; conjured wives for unmarried men,  
and husbands and children for single women.  
The real-estate broker was a master of fiction. 
Aravind Adiga, Last Man in Tower, 2011 
 
No power on Earth can stop an idea whose time  
has come.  I suggest to this august House that the 
 emergence of India as a major economic power  
in the world happens to be one such idea. 
Manmohan Singh1 
 
For several decades, India’s foreign policy was founded on two unshakeable 
primary concepts: in the political sphere, non-alignment; and in the economic 
sphere, as great a degree of autarky (swadeshi) as possible.2 These ideals were 
never fully realized, but Indian governments of various persuasions—particularly 
those in power in Nehru’s time, until his death in 1964—continued to uphold them 
amidst the complexities occasioned by underdevelopment, national heterogeneity, 
and the split from Pakistan at the end of colonial rule in 1947. Political change 
came only gradually: the signing of the Peace and Friendship Treaty with the Soviet 
Union in 1971 was not so much a formal departure from non-alignment as a de 
facto step away from it; and the acceptance of foreign aid—particularly technical, 
financial, and food aid—from Western donors and the IMF during the 1960s and 
1970s constituted an implicit rather than an explicit acknowledgement that 
economic self-reliance had not (yet) been achieved. 
                                                          
 1 From a 1991 budget speech by the then Finance Minister (later Prime Minister) Manmohan 
Singh. Quoted by Baru (2013: 37). 
 2  Nehru, the architect of India’s foreign policy, stressed the necessity of basing that policy on 
economic development. In the Constituent General Assembly he said: ‘Ultimately, foreign 
policy is the outcome of economic policy, and until India has properly evolved her economic 
policy, her foreign policy will be rather vague, rather inchoate, and will be groping’ (Nehru 
1961: 24). 
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Over the last two decades, both these foreign-policy concepts—political non-
alignment and economic autarky—have been abandoned and the Indian 
government has instituted fundamental changes in policy during this period. With 
the disappearance of the two opposing military blocs, non-alignment—through 
which India had sought to evade the influence of the major military powers—
ceased to be a defining criterion of foreign policy and began to look somewhat 
outdated.3 In the economic sphere, meanwhile, the dramatic shift towards 
liberalization, initiated in the early 1990s, when India found itself in the throes of a 
deep economic and political crisis, brought about the gradual disappearance of the 
concepts of self-reliance and protectionism. The inward-looking approach to the 
economy was abandoned. Since then, all Indian governments, whether headed by 
the Congress Party or by the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), have 
sought to integrate the Indian economy into the world market rather than pursue 
self-reliance. 
The loss of India’s foreign-policy basis at the end of the Cold War, the demise of 
the Soviet Union, the new foreign-policy emphasis on economic issues (such as 
trade and foreign investment), and the rejection of anti-Americanism heralded a 
new era in Indian foreign policy. Alongside the extraordinary expansion of the 
economy over the last two decades has come a growth in India’s aspiration to play 
a more active global role. This is making itself felt particularly strongly in 
multilateral forums, both economic (like the World Trade Organization and the 
International Monetary Fund) and political (the United Nations Security Council, the 
G20, and BRICS). However, economic success is not of itself a sufficiently solid basis 
for an enhanced global role. Domestic factors are also key when it comes to 
devising foreign-policy architecture. Such factors can both accelerate and hamper 
the implementation of a new foreign-policy concept. Stability at home and good 
relations in the region are the cornerstones on which any enhancement of global 
roles must be founded. 
In this paper I will take a closer look at key domestic factors of this kind and ask 
whether India’s social and political institutions are fit for a more substantial role in 
global governance4 or whether, as some Indian foreign-policy observers claim, ‘the 
fascination with India’s growing economic clout and foreign-policy overtures has 
glossed over its institutional limits, the many quirks of its political culture, and the 
significant economic and social challenges it faces’ (Ganguly 2012). 
Cultural and social heritage are important factors to consider in this context. 
Most importantly, we need to determine whether India’s social and political 
institutions are robust and adaptive enough to underpin the Indian elite’s ambition 
to assume a more substantial global role or whether they are an obstacle in coping 
with new challenges. 
                                                          
 3 Some foreign-policy thinkers regard non-alignment as antiquated (Thakur 1992, Mazumdar 
2011). Ganguly and Pardesi (2009: 11) talk of ‘a requiem for Nonalignment’. Others believe it 
can be revived and that it is still of value in Indian foreign policy (Khilnani et al. 2012). As 
former Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral put it: ‘It is a mantra that we have to keep 
repeating, but who are you going to be nonaligned against?’ (Quoted in Ganguly and Pardesi 
(2009: 11). 
  4  I deal with the conceptual basis of Indian foreign policy in a separate publication (Wulf 2013a). 
For India’s role in BRICS, see Debiel and Wulf 2013. 
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The first of the two main sections that make up this paper analyses conflicting 
economic, social, and political developments in India; the second looks at socio-
cultural and political factors that help explain how Indian institutions function. 
There then follows a brief concluding section. 
1   The Indian Paradox 
1.1 Conflicting Situations 
Paradox, inconsistency, and contradiction are an intrinsic feature of India’s role in 
the twenty-first century.5 To the foreign eye, the political process seems exotic and 
confusing—as chaotic as the traffic in the country’s mega-cities. India is described 
as the largest functioning democracy in the world, yet its society is one of the most 
corrupt and is dominated by traditional caste-structures. It is one of the fastest-
growing economies in the world but remains an underdeveloped, poverty-stricken 
country, where the vast majority of people live in acute need. It is viewed as an 
emerging power—possibly even a superpower in the making—but is still caught up 
in unresolved and sometimes violent conflicts with its immediate neighbours 
(Stuenckel 2012: 35). 
In an extensive special report on India, the Economist concluded that the country 
seemed ‘set on a promising path’. The national census, it said, revealed ‘fast-rising 
literacy; more girls in schools; the relentless spread of mobile phones’. The country 
ranked as the world’s tenth-biggest economy and was ‘more stable than ever’.6 The 
mobility of its population might even ‘give it an advantage over countries like 
China’.7 
However, India’s new world is not without its contradictions—indeed, the 
country’s political, social, and economic development has been neither coherent 
nor smooth. Amartya Sen talks of two Indias: ‘the first . . . lives a lot like California, 
the second (and more populous) . . . lives a lot like Sub-Saharan Africa’ (quoted by 
Guha, 2012: 11). 
Article 17 of the Indian constitution abolishes ‘untouchability’, but this is not 
reflected in real life (Mitra 2012: 139). The caste system continues to block upward 
mobility for millions in India, and those dalits who have become wealthy 
entrepreneurs on the back of the economic dynamic of the last two decades remain 
only a handful in number.8 The constitution affirms minority rights; various forms of 
                                                          
 5 Stuenckel (2012: 34) writes: ‘India’s role in today’s international context abounds with 
paradox.’ 
 6 Adam Roberts (2012), ‘Aim Higher’, Economist, 29 Sep., http://www.economist.com/node/ 
21563414. 
 7 ‘Express or Stopping?’ (2012), Economist 29 Sep., http://www.economist.com/node/21563420. 
 8 Dalits are underprivileged tribals and people traditionally considered ‘untouchable’. The rise 
of a small number of dalits to millionaire status has led to a debate about the opportunities 
open to this group. However, the success of these few does not appear to be representative 
(Iyer, Khanna, and Varshney, 2013: 58; see also Guru 2012).
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affirmative action are proposed as a means of supporting socially deprived sections 
of the population; and the Indian state is formally committed to ending various 
forms of inequality (Wankhede 2012: 40). Yet the social, political, and economic 
reality of Indian society is far from harmonious. India is polymorphous9—rich and 
poor, modern and traditional, secular and religious, industrialized and feudal, urban 
and rural, fragile and flexible, open and, at the same time, bureaucratic and 
hierarchically closed. 
Each of these labels captures an important aspect of Indian society, but none can 
of itself do justice to India’s new and complex role in the globalized world. Most 
explanations of the country’s ambition to act (and be accepted) as a global player 
discuss these within a ‘realist’ international political framework, in which it is 
assumed that states are rational actors pursuing their own interests and putting 
considerations of security, power, and influence above all else.10 Economic growth 
has indeed meant that ‘India had the resources for a significant modernization of 
its armed forces and the development of a range of instruments to convert its 
growing capabilities into influence’ (Mohan 2012: 27); but Indian foreign policy, its 
history and underlying ideology, are much more diverse and multi-faceted than this 
suggests. To understand India’s global aspirations—which contrast so starkly with 
the enormous difficulties it faces at home and beyond its borders—it is necessary 
to look deeper than the phenomenal economic growth of the last two decades and 
the ambitious military posture the country has adopted (Balachandran 2012).11 
1.2 The Economy: Growth, Poverty, and Inequality 
The Indian economy has experienced a phenomenal growth since the start of 
economic liberalization in the early 1990s and India is now one of the fastest-
growing economies in the world. Before this, growth rates had hovered at around 4 
per cent, with periodic dips below population-growth, prompting the renowned 
Indian economist Raj Krishna to coin the term ‘the Hindu rate of growth’.12 Figure 1 
shows how, in the years before the financial crisis, growth rates, measured in 
overall GDP, reached levels of almost 10 per cent. When the financial crisis broke in 
2008–9 and growth rates slowed down, the Indian government responded with 
strong fiscal and monetary stimuli, which brought GDP growth rates back up to 
about 9 per cent in the period 2009–11. However, this policy also had an impact on 
inflation, and the Reserve Bank of India reacted by raising interest rates. 
Investment slowed and, as Figure 1 indicates, growth rates fell substantially over 
the following two years and were expected to drop to only 5 per cent by 2012–13. 
 
                                                          
 9 Heinemann-Grüder (2011) uses this term in the title of his chapter on Indian federalism (pp. 
71–150). 
 10 On this, see my analysis elsewhere (Wulf 2013a). 
 11 For the last few years, India has been the world’s largest importer of arms. Over the past 
decade, it imported roughly 10 per cent of all the major weapons traded (SIPRI data bank, 
http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_toplist.php). 
 12 By which he means the inability of the Indian economy to grow at more than a modest 3 per 
cent per annum. 
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Figure 1. Annual GDP growth rates (overall GDP real, % change) 
 
Note  Annual growth rates for Five Year Plans up to 1997–2002, thereafter annually. 
Five Year Plans were not in place in the periods 1966–1969, 1979–1980, or 
1990–1992. 
Source  Government of India, Economic Survey 2012–13, Annex 4. 
 
What were the effects of the economic boom on poverty and income-distribution 
in India? The slogan garibi hatao—‘Eradicate poverty’—was coined by former Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi during the 1970s election campaign, long before the UN 
rallied to formulate the Millennium Development Goals (Wankhede 2012: 40). And 
yet, despite the faith in economic growth and modernity, large sections of the 
population remain poor. Neither the original economic concept of state-sponsored 
industrialization that prevailed during the first four decades after independence, 
nor the liberalization of the economy that has taken place over the last two, has 
come close to eliminating inequalities or eradicating poverty. 
Economic growth has undoubtedly improved the lot of a number of poor people, 
but the reduction in poverty and income-inequality has fallen far short of declared 
political goals. According to a 2012 report of the Government Planning 
Commission, the all-India poverty ratio, despite declining by 7.3 per cent in the five 
years under review, still stood at 29.8 per cent of the population in 2009–10. The 
figure for rural poverty, though said to have dropped by 8 per cent, remained at a 
substantial 33.8 per cent (Government of India, Planning Commission, 2012a). 
‘What is really startling’, conclude Drèze and Sen (2013: 190), ‘is not so much that 
the official poverty line is so low, but that even with this low benchmark, so many 
people are below it.’ Depending on the criteria applied, these ratios can work out 
much higher: in 2010–11, 68.7 per cent of the population fell within the World 
Bank’s ‘head count ratio’ (HCR) of $2 a day (PPP).13 Taken together, the statistics 
from the World Bank and the Planning Commission indicate that a minimum of 350 
million and possibly over 825 million of the total population of 1.2 billion Indians 
are still living below the poverty line. Gangopadhyay and Singh (2013) have 
                                                          
 13 http://search.worldbank.org/all?qterm=poverty+line+india&title=&filetype=. 
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analysed various methods of gathering poverty statistics and confirm that most 
studies indicate levels of poverty higher than those reported by the Planning 
Commission. 
The number of people living in poverty in India continues to be the highest of any 
country in the world. This is reflected, in wider regional terms, in the ‘Nonalignment 
2.0’ report, which sets out basic principles for Indian foreign and strategic policy 
over the next decade, and whose authors come to the sobering conclusion that: 
‘South Asia is home to the largest number of poor people in the world’ (Khilnani et 
al. 2012: 6). Poverty figures for India are highly contested and there has been 
intense debate about what is actually being measured here. Some authors claim 
that, despite the abundance of statistics and studies, there is still no agreement on 
such basic issues as how many poor are out there and which way the trends are 
moving (Vakulabharanam and Motiram 2012: 44). Prompted by the continuing 
contention, the Planning Commission set up an expert group—the Tendulkar 
Committee, named after its chairman—which suggested a change of methodology 
(Government of India, Planning Commission, 2009). However, the Committee’s 
suggestions were themselves criticized, with some commentators claiming that 
recorded reductions in poverty-rates were due in part to the changes in 
methodology—changes such as lowering the daily calorie-intake used as a measure. 
In a biting critique, Usha Patnaik (2010) writes: ‘Anyone can do away with poverty 
on paper simply by lowering the consumption standard against which poverty is 
measured.’ 
The poverty statistics also reveal inter-state variation, with Bihar (53.5 per cent) 
having the poorest record on poverty levels, and urban centres like Delhi (14.2 per 
cent) and the better developed states like Punjab (15.9 per cent), Haryana (20.1 per 
cent), and Gujerat (23 per cent) exceeding the all-India average by some margin.14 
Inequalities also exist within states (Khilnani et al. 2012: 47, Wankhede 2012: 42). 
Social indicators vary widely, not only between states and, within states, between 
districts, but also between religious and social groups, with women suffering 
systematic disadvantage (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012: 15). 
Applying the head count ratio, the Planning Commission also points up variations 
in the degree to which certain groups are affected. In rural areas, it says, Scheduled 
Tribes have the highest HCR (47.4 per cent), followed by Scheduled Castes (42.3 
per cent) and Other Backward Castes (31.9 per cent), as against 33.8 per cent for all 
classes. In urban areas, it is Scheduled Castes that have the highest HCR (34.1 per 
cent) followed by Scheduled Tribes (30.4 per cent) and Other Backward Castes 
(24.3 per cent), as against 20.9 per cent for all classes (Government of India, 
Planning Commission, 2012a). Again on the caste structure, Iyer, Khanna, and 
Varshney (2013: 53) conclude that: ‘[D]espite more than a decade of rapid 
nationwide economic growth, the share of [Scheduled Castes] and [Scheduled 
Tribes] in firm ownership and employment generation over the period 1990–2005 
increased only very modestly.’ 
According to the Indian government’s Economic Survey for 2012–13, annual per 
capita income (in real terms) increased from 14,330 Indian rupees (INR) in 1990–91, 
                                                          
 14 Gangopadhyay and Singh (2013) confirm the Planning Commission data cited here and show 
how the reported poverty-levels fluctuate widely between states. Mundle et al. (2012: 49) 
argue that indices of good governance demonstrate ‘a strong correlation between 
governance and development, as reflected in per capita income’. 
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at the start of economic liberalization, to 33,901 INR—or the equivalent of US 
$1.70 per day at current exchange-rates—in 2009–10 (Government of India 2012: 
Statistical Appendix). This rising trend in average per capita income gives no 
indication of the way in which the income is distributed. Inequalities here seem to 
be on the increase. In the case of urban India, the Gini index (indicating the degree 
of deviation from equal income-distribution) shows an increase ‘from 34.4% in 
1993–4 to 37.6% in 2004–5, and then to 39.3% in 2009–10. ... In fact, the urban elite, 
constituting about 10–15% of the total population in the country, has monopolised 
almost the entire relative gains after the economic reforms’ (Vakulabharanam and 
Motiram 2012: 46). This demonstrates clearly the urban–rural divide. In sum, 
economic reform has exacerbated income-inequality and has primarily benefited 
India’s urban elite, indicating growth that is skewed and unequal. Compared with 
the other BRICS states, however, India is the best-performing country when it 
comes to income-equality. All the rest have higher Gini coefficients: Russia comes in 
at 40 per cent, China at 48 per cent, Brazil at 51.9 per cent, and South Africa at 65 
per cent (Central Intelligence Agency, figures for 2009). 
Whereas the data on poverty-reduction is contested, the results of quantitative 
studies on income-distribution are much more cogent and differentiated, 
documenting inequalities at various levels—between urban and rural areas and, 
within urban areas themselves, between the elite and the workers 
(Vakulabharanam and Motiram 2012: 50). The government’s own statistics on 
poverty confirm these findings. The Planning Commission states that ‘[n]early 50% 
of agricultural labourers and 40% of other labourers are below the poverty line in 
rural areas, whereas in urban areas, the poverty ratio for casual labourers is 47.1%’. 
And referring to religious groups, it reports that ‘Sikhs have the lowest HCR in rural 
areas (11.9%) whereas in urban areas, Christians have the lowest proportion 
(12.9%) of poor [and in] urban areas [the] poverty ratio at [the] all India level is 
highest for Muslims (33.9%)’ (Government of India, Planning Commission 2012a). 
India has clearly not been so adept at translating its high rates of economic 
growth into reduced rates of poverty and an improvement in the lives of the 
disadvantaged sections of society. In fact the gap between the poor and the better-
off has widened. All these dry economic statistics find concrete expression in the 
state of human development in India. Although India’s ranking in the Human 
Development Index (HDI) has improved over the last two decades, it still languishes 
at the bottom of the ‘medium development’ group. The 2013 Human Development 
Report lists India 136th out of a total of 186 countries (United Nations 
Development Program 2013)—scarcely a cause for pride, given India’s global 
ambitions. Clearly, there is a glaring gap here between ambition and action. 
In theory, the liberal market economy resolves disparities and opens up 
opportunities for economic gain. What happens in practice in India is that chronic 
poverty remains entrenched along caste and class lines—with the growing middle 
class often being described as a new caste.15 In terms of the structure and future of 
the caste system, economic growth and modernization constitute a double-edged 
sword. Some members of the urban middle classes give the impression that castes 
no longer exist. However, ‘those displaced from traditional occupations rarely find 
a new one and are reduced to being landless, daily-wage laborers, tilling the fields 
of the upper castes and constructing the buildings of the new India’ (Vij 2012: 2). 
                                                          
 15 ‘Power Shifts’ (2012), Economist, 29 September, www.economist.com/node/21563423/print. 
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Given the traditional ties between the caste one is born into and the occupation 
one can follow, the caste system is clearly a potential obstacle on the economic 
path which Indian society has elected follow. At the same time, modernization and 
economic growth can help improve the lives of individuals from the poorer sections 
of society: urbanization, democratization, and increased levels of literacy, are 
slowly changing the rigid caste-system (Jürgenmeyer and Rösel 2009: 26) and 
economic liberalization has created at least some opportunities for upward 
mobility (Brosius 2009: 220). 
India’s economic rise has yet to be translated into concrete benefits for the poor 
on a mass scale: disparities in income, education, health-care, and general 
opportunities remain immense. The continuing incidence of starvation and 
malnutrition, high rates of illiteracy, and the growing number of suicides among 
highly indebted farmers, are expressions of a gross imbalance in economic growth. 
These disparities are not simply going to disappear and there is no adequate 
welfare-system to offset them. Although the level of food-security in India is much 
higher than in the early decades after independence, and the country is now able to 
feed itself, economic growth has not yet translated into ‘inclusive growth’ (Baru 
2013: 39). 
1.3 Security challenges at home 
India faces a number of security concerns in its immediate neighbourhood: South 
Asia is a region that abounds in conflict and several of India’s neighbours are 
regarded as failed states. Amongst the problems afflicting the country in this 
connection are: its long-standing dispute and stagnating political relations with 
Pakistan; delicate relations with a number of smaller neighbouring countries; and 
various disputes over Indian diasporas, the sharing of river water, and national 
borders. In addition, there are, of course, a number of unresolved issues with 
China—territorial claims, for example, and China’s invasion of Tibet. Relations 
between the two countries are competitive.16 One major challenge for the Indian 
government in the immediate neighbourhood will be the political and security 
situation in Afghanistan following the withdrawal of the NATO-led International 
Security Assistance Force (Pattanaik 2012). The potential for conflict in the area 
calls for significant economic and political investment on the part of India. 
But India’s security concerns do not lie solely abroad. There are pressing 
challenges at home, in the shape of Naxalite (Maoist-inspired) insurgency, Islamist 
extremism and terror—partly linked to Pakistan, and ethnically and religiously 
based political fundamentalism and militancy (Kumar and Kumar 2010: 17). The 
reasons for this internal unrest are manifold. They include: the failure of the state 
to provide basic services; state abuse of human rights and brutal suppression of 
unrest; and the nature of the counter-strategies employed by the state to address 
contentious issues (Khilnani et al. 2012: 43–9). Some of the threats to India’s 
security stem from the conflicting political and economic developments within 
society, which have created the ‘two Indias’ of rich and poor, developed and 
underdeveloped. These act as de-stabilizers, producing enormous friction and 
                                                          
 16 On these issues, see my comments elsewhere (Wulf 2013b). 
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Terrorist attacks by Muslim-inspired groups are nothing new to India. Acts of this 
kind have been a frequent occurrence in Jammu/Kashmir, supported in many cases 
from within Pakistan but recently also from within India. In the past, most of these 
attacks were directed against the Indian authorities, particularly the security 
forces, but the focus has now shifted to areas beyond Jammu/Kashmir, and the 
actions have become part of the notion of global jihad. The attack on Mumbai in 
November 2008—when a variety of Islamist groups, some based in India, 
engineered a series of terror attacks—marked the culmination of two decades of 
Islamist terror in India. The government and security forces are still trying to 
establish the causes of Indian-based terrorism of this kind, and to develop 
strategies to counter it (Kalyanaraman 2012). 
Although the number of fatalities due to terrorist violence has steadily 
decreased—from a peak of 4,507 in 2001 to 1,116 in 2006 and 117 in 201218—the 
Mumbai attack in particular created ‘an atmosphere of insecurity in the country, 
particularly among its vocal urban middle classes, who abruptly saw themselves at 
great risk’ (Sahni 2012: 13). 
On the right of the political spectrum, religious fundamentalists, working within 
the democratic process, seek the establishment of a Hindu theocracy in India. The 
BJP and a number of its sister organizations take a chauvinist Hindu stance and 
oppose the modern, secular, multicultural model of society. This policy has its roots 
in colonial times. The Indian National Congress, established in 1885, pursued a 
notion of India based on territory. The alternative was a model based on culture 
and religion, in which the Indian people were seen as defined by two opposing 
group-identities: Muslim and Hindu. It was this latter notion that lay behind the 
foundation of the radical Hindu Mahasabha and Rashtriya Swayam-sevak Sangh 
(RSS) groupings in the early twentieth century. Originally, neither Muslims nor 
Hindus viewed themselves as homogeneous groups. It was the British who 
introduced simplifications of this kind—for administrative purposes and as part of 
the notorious policy of ‘divide and rule’ (Wolf and Schultens 2009: 165–6). 
The ascent of the BJP, created in 1980 out of the fragments of the former 
Bharatiya Jan Sangh party, has been one of the most significant political 
developments to have occurred in modern India. Between 1951 and 1999, the party 
increased the number of its seats in parliament from 3 to 182 and its share of the 
overall vote from 3.1 per cent to 23.8 per cent (Wolf and Schultens 2009: 167). 
Under the umbrella of sangh parivar (‘family’), Hindu nationalists and 
fundamentalists have pursued a two-fold strategy, creating a network of 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary organizations committed to the Hindutva 
ideology (political or nationalist Hinduism), which envisages India as a great and 
militarily powerful nation (Kundu 2004: 8). At the heart of this extensive and 
diverse network is a ‘triumvirate’ comprising: 1. the RSS, a hierarchical right-wing 
paramilitary volunteer cadre organization that forms the ideological backbone of 
the movement; 2. the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, a religious organization; and 3. the 
BJP, providing the political/parliamentary representation (Wolf and Schultens 
                                                          
 18 ‘Fatalities in Terrorist Violence 1988–2012’, Institute for Conflict Management South Asia 
Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/data_sheets/ 
annual_casualties.htm. Of a total of more than 43,300 fatalities between 1988 and early 2013, 
over 14,600 are listed as civilians, over 6,000 as security-forces personnel, and over 22,600 as 
terrorists. 
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2009: 166) but also receiving support from its from its militant sister-organizations. 
Even before the BJP came to power, the rise of political Hinduism had become a 
major factor in Muslim–Hindu religious conflict (Malone 2011: 52). According to 
Upadhyay and Robinson (2012: 43), ‘the Sangh parivar and its political branch, the 
BJP, have been responsible for creating a fanatic political atmosphere since the 
1980s’. 
One of the many conflicts in this area occurred in 1992 and involved the 
destruction of a mosque by a violent mob of over 150,000 right-wing Hindu 
nationalists called to action by the Sangh parivar. The mosque, in the city of 
Ayodhya, had allegedly been built on the foundations of a Hindu temple which 
Hindus believed to be the birthplace of Lord Sri Rama. The riots that followed this 
event—not only in India but also in Pakistan and Bangladesh—claimed the lives of 
several thousand people (Wolf and Schultens 2009: 168). 
In his major work Defending India, Jaswant Singh, one of the strategists of the 
BJP-led National Democratic Alliance government, formerly a captain in the Indian 
Army, one-time Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, and later Minister of 
Defence and Minister of Finance, complained that previous policies had resulted in 
the neglect of a number of important aspects of Indian security: ‘What, therefore,’ 
he asks, ‘has been the lasting legacy of the past 50 years? An absence of certainties 
in security-related issues; no established land boundaries; an absence of a secure 
geopolitical environment; a devaluation of India’s voice in global affairs and 
worrisomely, not even a beginning of any institutional framework for 
conceptualizing and managing the country’s defence’ (Singh 1999: 268, quoted by 
Kundu 2004: 8). 
The BJP continues to be a major national party and remains an influential factor 
in national politics. As Ganguly (2014) points out, the Hindu Right ‘has yet to 
abandon its supremacist ideology’ and the religious dissension may flare up and 
turn violent. Galvanized by the chauvinist policies of the Hindus, says Ganguly, 
‘small numbers of Muslims have also become increasingly radicalized.’ 
Separatism and insurgency, terrorist attack, fundamentalist ethnocentric Hindu 
anti-secularism—these diverse threats to India’s security have not led to the break-
up of the country or to generalized violence. On the contrary, the social and 
political fabric has proved highly resilient. Nonetheless, these threats to the 
nation’s security and cohesion are real. Part of the problem has been the 
authorities’ lack of consistency in handling the problems. As Sahni (2012: 2) puts it: 
‘The state’s responses to existing and emerging challenges of internal security have 
been marked by a high measure of incoherence, structural infirmities, and a 
growing crisis of capacities.’ 
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2    Socio-cultural Explanations: Disorderly 
but Resilient Structures 
 
It is widely accepted that a country’s foreign policy is strongly influenced by 
domestic factors. Given the close intermeshing of the domestic and international 
environments, decision-makers formulating and implementing foreign policy must 
consider the pressures, challenges, and opportunities that exist at home. 
Western observers long doubted India’s ability to create a nation state and 
establish democracy. The country’s sheer size, diversity, and heterogeneity, and its 
split from Pakistan, confronted its founders with enormous problems. Their goal 
was to create a just society free from structural obstacles such as castes, 
communalism, religious strife, feudalism, and capitalist exploitation. The 
constitution adopted by independent India—a document based largely on the 
British parliament’s 1935 Government of India Act—is democratic, plural, federal, 
and republican. Still much treasured by the people of India, it emphasizes values 
such as freedom and liberty, social justice and equality. These are modern, universal 
norms. 
Independent India’s founding generation wanted the country’s foreign policy to 
be based on moral principles. Peace and total nuclear disarmament, dissolution of 
the military blocs, solidarity amongst developing countries, and good neighbourly 
relations with other nations were key components of their foreign-policy vision. 
However, many of the admirable aspirations in this area—and also in the domestic 
social and economic sphere—were soon dashed, and successive Indian 
governments found themselves slipping down from the moral high ground into 
communal unrest, armed conflict with neighbours, deteriorating governance, and 
frustrated ambition on the global stage. There were periods when government 
policy was out of touch with the demands of the time and the interests of the 
people. Those times appear to be past and, bolstered by two decades of economic 
growth, India seems to have regained its self-assertiveness. Today, India is ‘an 
example of successful nation-building in an extremely fractionalized society’ 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012: 5). Pragmatism rather than moral principle is now the 
watchword of Indian foreign policy, and in its dealings regionally and globally it 
now prioritizes national interest and what it terms ‘strategic autonomy’.19 
The roots of India’s newly discovered self-esteem and confidence go deeper than 
its impressive economic growth-rates. To understand what motivates India’s new, 
explicitly globally oriented foreign policy and its diplomatic efforts at transcultural 
cooperation and external engagement after decades of insularity, we need to be 
aware of the political, social, cultural, and economic background, and of the history 
of Indian society. In what follows here, I explore three facets of Indian society that 
contribute to, and help shape, the country’s new-found buoyancy in foreign policy. 
The first is its capacity to integrate tradition and modernity and produce resilient 
institutions. The second is its amorphous nature, which endows it with a peculiar 
ability to improvise despite an inclination to vagueness. And the third is the 
competition and cooperation between political actors at national and federal level, 
                                                          
 19 For a discussion of this term, and the foreign-policy ideas underlying it, see Debiel and Wulf 
(2013), where the topic is addressed from the point of view of cooperation within BRICS. 
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which has led to the emergence of a functioning federal system, complete with 
checks and balances, and which also generates the partly contradictory forces that 
shape relations between central and state governments. 
2.1 Hybridization: Merging Tradition and Modernity—Yoga and Wi-Fi20 
Despite mass poverty, a poor outlook for democracy, and a frequently articulated 
expectation of failure, the Indian Union and the nation state have survived, and 
most near-to-medium-term scenarios see India as a rising power. 
To the uninformed observer, Indian politics, though recognizably democratic in its 
processes and institutions, appears strange and sometimes archaic. The uniqueness 
of the country’s approach to policy-making is something the country’s elite are 
fond of pointing out. What initially appears familiar may turn out to be surprisingly 
other (Bilgin 2008). This state of affairs results from Indian society’s capacity—
exercised over centuries—to integrate foreign influences into existing structures. 
The rules and regulations underlying Indian politics interweave modern and 
traditional strands of what is a highly complex society. The political elite—and also 
the upper echelons of the cultural and business worlds—have blended well-
established social traditions with modern institutions inherited from the British 
(Mitra 2012). Politicians play an important role as arbiters in resolving the tensions 
between traditionally oriented society and modern state institutions.  The state is 
not just an agent of liberalism and an enforcer of norms; politicians and political 
parties are also ‘partisan defender[s] of the traditional, marginal and patrimonial’ 
(Mitra 2012: 136). 
The political elite have shaped a system whose institutions, to the surprise of 
many Western observers, have proved extraordinarily resilient (Guha 2012: 6). 
Despite sometimes appearing dysfunctional to the Western eye, these institutions 
have withstood the pressures of widespread personal greed, bribery, nepotism, 
and corruption.21 Clientilism, patrimonial networks, and vote-rigging are 
expressions of a deeply ingrained pattern of group privileges in Indian society. 
Despite this endemic malpractice amongst politicians and civil servants, democracy 
is alive and well and enjoying continued popularity: most citizens turn out for 
democratic elections, and the image of India as a multicultural, secular society is 
one that is fostered and celebrated (Banerji 2012: 45). 
Although British colonialism was extremely influential in shaping the Indian 
paradigm and Indian political institutions, the Indian approach has important roots 
elsewhere too—roots that continue to be of relevance today. One such is the 
treatise on statecraft entitled the Arthashastra, written by Kautilya nearly two and 
half millennia ago. Indians often compare it to Machiavelli’s The Prince. It ‘distilled 
all of traditional Indian thought on the question of good governance, maintained 
that it was essential for the king to have coercive authority (Danda), and elaborated 
                                                          
 20 The ideas in this section were inspired by Mitra (2012). 
 21 For examples of corruption, see ‘Power Shifts’ (2012), Economist, 29 September, 
www.economist.com/node/21563423/print. Indian newspapers report widely on the activities 
of corrupt politicians and bureaucrats—e.g. the ‘Coalgate’ scandal (Vaishnav 2012). In 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, India ranks 94th out of a total of 
177 countries (http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/). 
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in great detail on how this was to be established with the help of the army, police, 
and secret service. But it also stated that the god king had to devote himself to the 
interests of the people, and that Danda had to be exercised not arbitrarily but in 
accordance with laws codified to ensure fairness, and promote governance for the 
common good (Dharma)’ (Mundle et al. 2012: 42). Exploring the ideas of state 
influence and state interests, Kautilya sanctioned the use of force for the purposes 
of establishing political order and is therefore ‘often evoked as an ancient 
precursor of contemporary realism’ (Shahi 2013: 51). In the terminology of current, 
Western-dominated, International Relations, Kautilya’s approach can be classified 
as ‘rationalist’, in the sense of states acting in their own interest. 
Contrasting with this political outlook is Mahatma Gandhi’s concept of satyagraha 
or non-violent resistance. Sometimes described as a conservative, Gandhi did 
indeed criticize certain strands of modernity but was by no means hostile to 
scientific progress and enlightenment. And there were some traditional aspects of 
Indian society with which he disagreed—the treatment of women, for example, or 
the caste system and untouchability. Gandhi ‘sought to assimilate the best of 
tradition and modernity’ (Prabhu 2012: 139). Satyagraha as taught by Gandhi drew 
on traditional practices to defeat modern British institutions such as the colonial 
administration and the colonial armed forces. 
This mixing and merging of culturally specific strands in society, the conflation of 
tradition and modernity, is not a new phenomenon in India. Hybridization of this 
kind did not begin with recent economic modernization, nor with the introduction 
of (Soviet-style) socialist economic planning in the early years of Indian 
independence. Mitra (2012: 140) argues that the fusion of art, architecture, culture, 
and politics—between Islam, Hinduism, Jainism, and Buddhism—was a feature of 
life under the Great Mughals, from the 16th to the 18th centuries, following their 
advance into India from Persia. Indian society was able to integrate Mughal rule 
into its way of life without relinquishing its own identity. The British colonialists, 
masters in ‘divide and rule’, exploited traditional symbols and processes but also 
introduced new institutions.22 The combined action of British colonial rule and 
Indian resistance to it engendered hybrid institutions founded on ‘traditional 
norms in modern garb’ (Mitra 2012: 139). Thus we find distinctively Indian political 
instruments—hunger strikes, gherao (the encirclement of politicians), dharna 
(sitting and fasting on the doorstep of an offender until a demand is granted)—
being used alongside modern methods such as election campaigns, parliamentary 
debates, lobbying, and judicial rulings. 
Unlike the Western mind-set, the Hindu way of thinking tolerates difference, 
contrast, and contradiction. It does not demand ‘the suppression of difference’ 
(Tickner 2003: 304) and does not feel socialism’s urge to pursue egalitarianism. 
This, in short, is the reason for the continued existence of Hinduism’s inequitable 
hierarchical caste-system, with its stress on difference rather than on social 
equality and classlessness. On the other hand, the need to overcome inequality and 
discrimination has been a major concern since the time of independence. The 
Indian constitution—dubbed ‘idealized rhetoric’ by Wankhede (2012: 39)—is 
inclusive in its aspirations, and the Indian democratic process, though far from 
perfect, allows room for the expression of political discontent. The constitution 
                                                          
 22 Dalrymple (2003) argues that in the early period of colonization, Indian society left more of a 
mark on the British colonists than they did on it. 
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‘envisages a society based on the ethical values of individual freedom, socio-
economic liberties and communal harmony’ (ibid.). At the same time, diversity is 
one of the assets of Indian society: ‘[I]nstead of deploring our lack of homogeneity’, 
writes historian Dharma Kumar, ‘we should glory in it. Instead of regarding India as 
a failed or deformed nation-state, we should see it as a new political form, perhaps 
even as a forerunner of the future’ (quoted by Guha, 2012: 15). Considerations such 
as these are becoming increasingly important in present-day political processes: 
‘Parties that exploit narrow caste mobilization find it necessary to progressively 
widen their caste base’ (Sahni 2012: 23). It seems minority consciousness is a new 
phenomenon (Upadhyay and Robinson 2012: 44). 
The product of these complex socio-political processes is a series of enduring and 
resilient institutions—long-established but open to change. It is this ‘indigenous 
evolution and resilience of the political and social system’, the ‘cutting edge of the 
process of self-assertion of Indian society’ (Mitra 2012: 141), that affords the 
country scope for action in foreign affairs. A set of vital hybrid institutions and a 
series of political rules and regulations that do their job (though not always 
effectively) is what has ultimately emerged from the interplay of complex and 
sometimes contradictory elements such as anti-colonialism, independence, nation-
building, economic experimentation (from Soviet-style planning to neo-liberal 
deregulation), democratic processes and governance (alongside rampant 
corruption), economic upturn (in which high-tech industry flourishes alongside 
feudal agricultural structures), and social difference and divergence (contrasting 
with constitutional norms and largely rhetorical policies). India is a partly third-
world society with partly first-world institutions (Mitra 2012: 137). 
Indian society and its structures and institutions are both fragmented and 
integrative. They may appear dysfunctional from a global perspective, but they are 
robust and resilient. The ‘yoga and wi-fi’ image is meant as an expression, not of 
contradiction but of a capacity to integrate apparent opposites into a workable, if 
not always very effective, social, political, and economic process. 
2.2 Amorphous Practices: Rhetoric and Improvisation 
Not only does India have a polymorphous and diverse society (Heinemann-Grüder 
2011); its mode of operation, political and practical, is often nebulous, 
unstructured, and amorphous. Indians themselves often remark how skilled they 
are at planning and how ineffective at implementation. Writing about ‘The India 
Model’ and the reasons for many of its failings, the author and political 
commentator Gucharan Das remarks that ‘a mundane inability to implement 
policy—reflecting a bias for thought and against action—may have been even more 
damaging [than the underlying ideology]’. Improvisation is more highly developed 
than implementation—indeed, it has become something of an art, and muddling 
through is the preferred conceptual approach. Nevertheless, Indian institutions do 
somehow manage to work.23 In the words of Khilnani and company: ‘[A]s much as 
formal guarantees embodied in the constitution and in legislation, it is informal 
                                                          
 23 In his study Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Douglas North asks: 
‘Why do institutions work in South Asia, sometimes?’ (quoted in Mitra 2012: 154). 
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mechanisms of working together’ that render the political system functional (2012: 
45). 
The fluid and amorphous character of Indian society is also reflected in the way 
the state and economy are run. Land reform is a typical example. It has been on the 
agenda since independence and its stated purpose is to do away with the feudal 
structures that continue to dominate agriculture. Up to now, however, what it has 
delivered is mostly rhetoric and it has ‘[made] little headway in terms of actual 
implementation [concentrating instead] on direct poverty reduction measures 
(food programs) to do something about poverty and not to antagonize the land 
lords’ (Mitra 2012: 142). One such programme is the National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act (NREGA).24  This scheme, and others like it, are intended to help 
safeguard the livelihoods of the rural population, but the reality is that the majority 
of India’s rural inhabitants have benefited very little from economic liberalization. 
Indian politicians and economic planners incline towards the ‘third’ or ‘middle’ 
way, as reflected in the policy of non-alignment, which allowed them to avoid 
commitment to either of the opposing blocs. Economically, the founding fathers of 
the Indian Union felt that the country should steer a course between socialism and 
capitalism, and the now long-established ‘Five Year Plan’ and its overseer, the 
Planning Commission, originally combined features of Soviet-style planning with 
capitalist, private-sector methods. Although the model of industrialization in 
operation in India has undergone a complete transformation—away from planning 
and import substitution towards neo-liberal deregulation—the concept of the Five 
Year Plan has survived and continues to guide Indian economic policy: the Twelfth 
Five Year Plan, covering the period 2012 to 2017, is now under way. In 1994, when 
the government was beginning to engage with economic liberalization and was 
seeking to attract foreign capital to India, it took part for the first time in the World 
Economic Forum in Davos. Asked about the government’s new strategy, Prime 
Minister Rao ‘answered in generalities [a]nd rather than focusing on India’s new 
welcoming attitude to private capital, [he] and Commerce Minister Pranab 
Mukherjee highlighted India’s vague “middle way”’ (Kale 2009: 58). 
Vagueness and inertia also characterize India’s bureaucracy. As the Economist put 
it in its 2012 special report on India: ‘The core of the internal problems is often 
summed up as “governance”. That means, first, politicians (netas) who do not rule 
[and second] babus, bureaucrats working in an ossified system bequeathed by 
Britain. Their dead hand explains much of what does not happen day-to-day. The 
“licence raj” of old may have gone, but much too much of the commanding heights 
of the economy are still run—or rather, held back—by officials.. . . Babus have been 
a problem since Mughal days, but things have got worse . . . “No civil servant is 
remotely interested in pushing something along. There are three years’ worth of 
pipeline projects stuck,” lamented a senior planning official earlier this year.’25 Such 
a bureaucracy is clearly a hindrance to economic development. Sibal (2012: 17) 
concludes that increased liberalization ‘will simply perpetuate corruption and 
further inequality’ if the government does nothing to enhance its regulatory 
capacities. The signs of economic progress are evident in general growth, but the 
omnipresent bureaucracy, at odds with the neo-liberal economic model, and the 
                                                          
 24 http://nrega.nic.in/netnrega/home.aspx. 
 25 Adam Roberts (2012), ‘Aim Higher’, Economist, 29 September, http://www.economist.com/ 
node/21563414. 
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elite’s inertia in regard to empowerment of the poor hinder the implementation of 
effective poverty-reduction policies. 
The administration is over-bureaucratized and politics is increasingly dominated 
by nepotism, corruption (Banerjee 2012: 46), and criminal practices. According to 
Sanchez (2012: 51): ‘In the current Indian parliament, of the 543 elected 
representatives of the lower house, 158 (29 per cent) are currently charged with a 
criminal offence.’ The distinguished constitutional lawyer Nani Palkhival (1998) 
gave it as his ‘firm conviction’ that ‘it is not the Constitution which has failed the 
people but it is our chosen representatives who have failed the Constitution’. Sagar 
(2009: 812) makes an interesting socio-cultural comment here. Although India’s 
political elite express admiration for systems of regulation, he says, they ‘lazily 
circumvent the norms advocated by the very same systems [and in this] their 
behaviour is akin to that of ordinary Indians who bemoan the chaos of India’s 
streets, even as they ignore traffic signals themselves’. 
This gap between planning and implementation is not a new phenomenon. It is a 
recurrent feature of Indian politics. ‘The socialist dream of the Nehruvian era was 
high on optimism but failed to fulfil and satisfy the hopes and expectations of 
ordinary people. State institutions do advocate people-centric development but 
the control and interest of the dominant classes and castes hardly allowed it to 
happen’ (Wankhede 2012: 40). The BJP-led government of the Hindu nationalists 
has engaged in the same kind of bluster: its fulsome rhetoric about illegal 
immigration from Bangladesh was followed by the erection of a highly symbolic but 
ineffective security-fence along the border (Sagar 2009: 810). 
The Indian state system abounds with obstacles to decision-making and 
incentives to deferment. This is all part of a long tradition of passivity and 
reactivity. As Sagar (2009: 812) observes: ‘[T]here is an undeniable sense in which 
the operative mentality in general has been that of jugaad, a colloquial Indian term 
that roughly translates as “quick fix” or “work-around”. This mentality can be traced 
to India’s uneven encounter with modernity: the forms and institutions have been 
imported or grafted on, but the spirit of modernity, an innate appreciation of 
rational thinking, has not taken root.’ As pointed out previously, new institutions 
have been conflated with existing, traditional structures. This is one of the 
elements that gives Indian society its strength, but it is also an impediment to an 
economy seeking to compete on the global market. Performance differentials 
become evident and the ‘licence Raj’ mentality suppresses creative energy (Guha 
2012: 10). 
Addressing the adverse consequences of its failings in governance represents a 
major challenge for India, not only in terms of its future economic development but 
also from the point of view of foreign policy. High rates of economic growth cannot 
of themselves guarantee an enhanced global role. The conclusion which Dahiya and 
Behuria (2012: 220) draw in regard to India’s role in the region has wider 
application. They attribute India’s failure to deliver on high-level promises to a 
‘sorry state of coordination within the country’. To establish its credibility, they say, 
India will need to ‘improve its project management skills, coordination mechanisms, 
and delivery capabilities’. Having said all this, it should be emphasized that, 
however inconsistent these practices may appear from the outside, they are not 
necessarily perceived as such within India itself. 
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2.3 Functioning Political Institutions: Federalism and Centralism in 
Balance 
2.3.1  Keeping the Union, Building a Nation State 
Separatism and national break-up are threats which India has faced since pre-
independence times. Even with the departure of Pakistan, there was no let-up in 
the quest for autonomy and separation: aspirations to cultural and linguistic 
homogeneity and economic autonomy have caused a series of old states to 
disappear and new ones to be created within the Indian Union. All this, however, 
has not led to the ‘balkanization’ of India. Beck et al. (2010) identify three waves of 
state-formation, during which the overall number of states has increased from 
fourteen in the early period (1956 to 1966) to the 2013 tally of twenty-eight plus 
seven Union Territories.26 Ronald Watts, an expert on federalism, regards the 
‘territorial social diversity and fragmentation’ in India and elsewhere as a desirable 
characteristic but considers central powers important in resisting ‘possible 
tendencies to balkanization’. Despite the serious threats of separation it has faced 
from regionally based parties and from both the Left and the Hindu nationalist 
Right, the country has remained one nation and is not likely either to break up or to 
become a Hindu state. 
Even before independence, the Constituent Assembly had reached a general 
consensus that India should be built as a nation. On the moot point of centralism 
versus federalism, a ‘healthy compromise’ was ultimately arrived at, with the 
constitution describing India as a ‘Union of States’, ‘implying that its unity is 
indestructible’ (Singh and Misra 2012: 2).27 A vigorous system of checks and 
balances was established, with countervailing forces operating between the centre 
and the regions (Mitra 2012: 138, Sahni 2012: 23). 
The constitution prescribes various institutional arrangements for ensuring a 
balance of power between the centre and the federal states. One example is the 
post of state governor, authorized by central government and vested with 
extraordinary powers in times of crisis. Another is the Supreme Court, which ‘enjoys 
considerable esteem and broad-based competence in the examination of 
constitutional correctness’ (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012: 8). In his analysis of federal 
conflict-management in India, Heinemann-Grüder (2012: 12) concludes that: ‘In 
general, [India’s] federal system proved to be adaptive, pragmatic and innovative; 
trust in the federal institutions is high.’ ‘Cooperative federalism’ is the term used by 
Singh and Misra to describe the centre–state balance in India, and Mitra (2012: 49) 
sums up Indian federalism as ‘very much a hybrid Indian creation, combining 
imported concepts of power-sharing with indigenous methods of consensus and 
accommodation’. 
As prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, Nehru formulated Indian foreign 
policy virtually single-handedly. Those times are long gone, but foreign policy 
remains essentially a centrally directed affair. Despite minor encroachments by 
state governments on the power of central government, the conduct of foreign 
policy is still very much the preserve of the centre—or more precisely the privilege 
                                                          
 26 Approval was recently given for the division of Andhra Pradesh into two states. 
 27 On the nation state and democracy, see Banerjee 2012. 
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of the executive, given that parliament plays only a marginal role in this area. As a 
complex, continent-wide democracy, India is often absorbed in its own internal 
politics and in the various disputes between its many political parties. With the 
exception of relations with China and Pakistan, foreign affairs rarely play a role in 
domestic politics or at the hustings (Ghosh 1994: 816). The outcomes of elections in 
the twenty-eight federal states and the autonomous regions are generally 
determined by domestic, provincial, or indeed local factors—but local factors, by 
contrast, can sometimes affect foreign-policy decisions. 
Globalization is presenting India’s finely tuned centre–state relations with 
additional challenges, including in regard to foreign policy. All over the world, 
social movements are contesting the legitimacy of the nation-state system of 
governance; non-state actors (from industry, trade, and finance) are pursuing their 
own business-interests abroad, usually with the consent and support of the 
governments in question; NGOs are acting as guardians of civil and minority rights; 
and ecological campaigners are forcing governments to take heed of their 
demands. India has been dubbed ‘NGO capital of the world [hosting as it does] up 
to 100,000 different organizations and self-help associations’ (Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2012: 22). Over the past two decades, Indian foreign investments abroad 
have increased substantially, with flag often following trade.28  
Two further factors are currently calling the well-established centre–state 
balance into question. The first is the strong domestic tendency to emphasize local, 
regional, and cultural particularities, leading to federal-state engagement in 
international-relations issues. The second is the transformation of the centre–state 
power-equation that has resulted from globalization and the economic 
liberalization of the 1990s (Mazumdar 2011: 175). Both trends involve centrifugal 
as well as centripetal forces. 
Economic issues are not the only motor here: linguistic and ethnic diversity as 
well as cultural and historical differences have given rise to questions on the role of 
central government. 
2.3.2  Party Politics and Regional Self-assertion 
The decade that followed the defeat of the Congress Party in the national 
elections of 1989 was a period of great political instability. It saw five national 
elections and six governments, some of them extremely short-lived. Instead of the 
single-party domination that had prevailed with the Congress Party under Nehru, 
there was a series of coalition governments, and regionally based or state-level 
parties emerged, often with regionally or caste-based programmes. The gains in 
popularity made by these groups usually came at the expense of support for 
nationally oriented parties (Mazumdar 2011: 172). The number of political parties 
                                                          
 28 The subject of NGO influence on foreign policy, and of the influence of Indian foreign trading 
and investment activity on government action, is not dealt with in detail here. In brief: though 
many of the Indian NGOs are poorly institutionalized and fragmented, there are a number 
who do manage to bend the government’s ear. And on the matter of foreign trading and its 
influence, the endeavours of Indian private enterprise have resulted in an increase in 
diplomatic activity on the part of the government—e.g. in Africa and Latin America (Destradi 
and Küssner 2013). 
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has multiplied and their diversity and fragmentation reflect the heterogeneity of 
Indian society (Béteille 2013: 37). 
The combination of multi-party fragmentation and the constant tension between 
centralizing forces and the push towards greater regional autonomy puts central 
government authority under strain. Regionally based parties are demanding 
greater independence from national government. Although certain groupings that 
operate largely at state level call themselves ‘national’, there are in fact only two 
parties with nation-wide reach: the Indian National Congress and the Bharatiya 
Janata Party.29 In 2012, regional parties were in power in nine of the twenty-eight 
federal states. In the remaining nineteen states, it was the two national parties that 
formed the government, usually in coalition with smaller parties (Singh and Misra 
2012: 5). ‘States are the solution to India’s policy dilemmas, but also the problem. 
When India’s central government is unwilling or unable to take action on policy 
reform, its states are often heralded as the solution to gridlock or “policy paralysis” 
because Indian federalism gives the states considerable space for policy innovation’ 
(Vaishnav 2012). 
Many parties, including the Indian National Congress and the Communist Party, 
have spawned competing splinter-groups—a tendency that has become endemic in 
Indian politics and has led to frequent transfers of power at central and state level. 
Parliamentary ‘floor-crossing’ from government to opposition, often motivated by 
the promise of personal gain, has resulted in the de-stabilization of government. In 
situations such as this, party leaders become preoccupied with maintaining 
themselves in office and their capacity for decision-making on foreign affairs is 
severely hampered. Weak minority governments at national level have not usually 
shown themselves to be very proactive in foreign affairs (Mazumdar 2011: 172). 
The internal dynamics of coalition governments have had a significant impact on 
a number of major foreign-policy matters. In line with their general anti-American 
stance and their belief in the need for continued non-alignment, India’s various 
communist parties opposed the 2005/2008 nuclear deal between the United States 
and India. These parties formed part of the support for the Congress-led coalition 
headed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Refusing to give in to the communist 
pressure, Singh was forced to marshal support from other parties in order to 
escape a vote of no confidence and be able to conclude the deal with the US 
government. ‘The government’s narrow escape’, concludes Mazumdar (2011: 173), 
‘highlighted the risks associated with reorientation of foreign policy [against a 
background] of ideological differences.’ 
Overall, however, despite these ups and downs, coalition government has worked 
successfully at both national and federal level, and India’s institutions, though 
marred by a number of serious flaws, have helped make the world’s largest 
democracy a functional and vibrant one. In spite of these positive developments, 
and in contrast to the approach taken by certain Western democracies, the political 
elite has so far refrained from promoting India as a model for other countries. In its 
foreign relations, the Indian government has often sought to shift the spotlight 
                                                          
 29 The Communist Party of India (CPI) is recognized by the Election Commission (the body that 
oversees all electoral affairs in India) as a national party but actually underwent a split during 
the 1960s as a result of ideological differences, resulting in the establishment of the 
Communist Party of India (Marxist) or CPI(M). Communist influence varies widely from state 
to state. 
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away from issues relating to human rights and civil liberties and has avoided 
lecturing other governments on these matters. Instead, it has sought to cooperate 
even with governments (e.g. in Myanmar and Iran) that have at times been treated 
as outcasts by large sections of the international community (Sagar 2009: 804, 
Majumdar 2011). 
2.3.3 The Expanding Role of the Federal States in Foreign Policy 
State governments are becoming increasingly active in areas that are considered 
to come within the purview of central government. At the same time, the centre 
involves itself in activities that are actually part of the remit of the federal states. 
Clearly then, centre–state relations are changing. But the change is not 
unidirectional, to the sole advantage of either the centre or the state. Domestic 
political and economic forces seem to be pulling in opposite directions and it is not 
yet clear whether the end-result will be more decentralization or less. What does 
seem clear, however, is that if the present trends continue, central government will 
have to take greater account of the interests of the states when conducting 
foreign policy. 
This is not an entirely new development. The state governments of Punjab and 
Jammu/Kashmir have always exerted influence on India’s relations with Pakistan. 
And regional factors and state interests have played an important part in 
conflictual events such as the expulsion of the Portuguese from Goa in 1961, the 
separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971, and the struggle of the Tamil 
Tigers in Sri Lanka over the last twenty-five years. 
The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), a regional party based in Tamil Nadu, 
has been an important ally in Congress-led national governments over many years. 
It has strongly influenced politics in Tamil Nadu itself and formerly campaigned for 
an independent Tamil homeland—a free ‘Tamil Eelam’—of the kind fought for by 
the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. In India, the Tamil Tigers were regarded as terrorists 
and the position of the central government, which sought a non-violent solution to 
the civil war in Sri Lanka, was complicated by coalition politics. In effect, the DMK, 
although loyal to the government, limited the latter’s options in regard to policy on 
Sri Lanka (Mazumdar 2011: 173). 
One area in particular in which states have become more proactive is that of 
cross-border affairs. The government of West Bengal, for example, negotiates with 
Bangladesh over water issues; Tamil Nadu is seeking to impose economic sanctions 
on Sri Lanka; and Jammu/Kashmir and Punjab have made it clear they wish to be 
involved in central government negotiations with Pakistan over water (Singh and 
Misra 2012: 1). 
During the present legislative period, there have been a number of examples of 
regional parties influencing or reversing important foreign-policy decisions taken 
by the coalition government in Delhi (Maihack and Plagemann 2013). Because 
neither of the two national parties was able to form a government without support 
from regional parties, foreign policy is now increasingly having to take local, state, 
and regional demands into consideration in order to keep coalition partners happy. 
Economic issues also exert push and pull influences on centre–state relations and 
it is not clear whether the end-result will be greater centralization or greater 
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federalization. Even at a time of economic liberalization and extraordinary 
economic growth, dichotomous relationships persist—not just between rich and 
poor but also between more developed states (such as Punjab, Maharashtra, 
Karnataka, and Kerala) and their less well developed counterparts (Orissa, Bihar, 
and Uttar Pradesh, for example). This has fuelled the desire of some states for 
greater fiscal autonomy. 
State governments have initiated negotiations with foreign investors—and 
indeed with international financial institutions such as the World Bank (Kirk 2011). 
With the consent of central government, the World Bank now concentrates its 
efforts on less developed states like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh rather than on the 
centre—though it has on occasion also interacted directly with better-developed 
states such as Karnataka and Tamil Nadu (Biswas 2012: 135). At the same time, in a 
bid to protect their domestic industries, state governments actively oppose foreign 
direct investment (Singh and Misra 2012: 1, Ganguly 2012). 
Contrary economic tensions are also evident in other areas. Whilst state 
governments insist on the principle of subsidiarity and call for greater fiscal 
powers, authority continues to rest first and foremost with the federal state. At the 
same time, central government involves itself in social programmes which it is the 
federal states’ privilege and duty to carry out. Although responsibility for the social 
sector (education, health, welfare, etc.) lies with the federal authorities, central 
government’s share of total spending in this area is greater than that of the states 
(Rath 2013: 70). In some sectors, state governments are gaining greater powers; in 
others, central government is encroaching on their competencies. 
Conclusion 
Indian society is a mixture of traditionalism and modernism, of old Bharat30 and 
new republic. As a result, the question of whether India’s social structures and 
political institutions are robust enough to allow it to assume a global role is not one 
that can be answered unambivalently. 
Despite major economic reforms and the elimination of outdated and debilitating 
practices, India still faces numerous problems at home, particularly in regard to 
social and economic inequality. Its greatest challenge is to improve the lives of the 
many millions of its people currently living in appalling poverty. The persistent 
divisions along caste lines will continue to constitute a major obstacle to 
development. Thanks to regionally and socially oriented party politics, dalits have 
increasingly been integrated into the political elite, and the lower castes in general 
have become more politically empowered (Teltumbde 2013: 11). However, these 
same party politics have left the nationally oriented parties weaker and have made 
the formation of stable governments and the pursuit of a consistent foreign policy 
more difficult. 
Poverty, a feudal system of land ownership, and gender-based violence are 
amongst the major social constraints hampering the country. India remains a male-
dominated society and the much-publicized rape of a student in Delhi in December 
2012 turned the international spotlight on traditional attitudes of ‘male 
                                                          
 30 ‘Bharat’ is the Sanskrit name for India, derived from Hindu mythology. 
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superiority’. As the rising number of rapes demonstrates, what happened in Delhi 
was not an isolated, if unfortunate, occurrence, and the spontaneous protests that 
erupted in the wake of the crime have certainly not changed the general attitude 
to women, towards whom there continues to be a deep-rooted disregard. ‘The 
organising principles of the family in India’, says Roy (2013: 25) ‘are structured to 
service men.’ These realities are not easy to overcome. Aware of the importance of 
inclusive policies, the Prime Minister stated in 2005 that ‘India must show that 
democracy can deliver development and empower the marginalised’ (Manmohan 
Singh, quoted in Baru 2013: 41). 
India has a good knowledge-base. Every year, its colleges, universities, and elite 
institutions turn out around 500,000 graduate engineers of various calibres.31 
However, overall expenditure on education is not very high, the average number of 
years of schooling is comparatively low at 4.4, and the adult literacy rate is no more 
than 62.8 per cent (UNDP 2011). Nevertheless, India boasts ‘a full range of high-
class colleges, universities and elite institutions which produce sufficient numbers 
of graduates for skill-intensive sectors’ (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012: 16). 
The enthusiasm generated by India’s economic growth has obscured some of 
structural deficits of Indian society. The growth has been extraordinary, and 
investment in the military, for example, is staggering in its proportions. However, 
economic expansion has primarily benefited capital- and skill-intensive production 
and has therefore not eliminated structural unemployment or brought much 
benefit to the agricultural sector. 
The public sector, of considerable size, remains bureaucratic and intensely 
regulated, and, despite a lot of ‘fat-trimming’, still seems unable to do its job 
satisfactorily. Entrepreneurs are confronted with ‘antiquated legal regimes and 
idiosyncratic rule-making’ (Ganguly 2012). Corruption is a serious problem at 
various levels and India ranks high on the list of countries afflicted by this malady. 
Corrupt practices have become ‘an accepted fact of life’ in Indian administration 
and daily life (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012: 21). Such practices are criticized but no 
sustained effort is made to combat them.  Widespread corruption is also partly 
responsible for the inefficiency of the Indian police and judicial system: law 
enforcement is undoubtedly beset by practical difficulties, and the judiciary is 
clearly overburdened by its massive case-load, but both entities also suffer from a 
well-known want of impartiality. Meanwhile, civil rights are guaranteed, the press is 
free, and there is an almost total absence of anti-democratic forces—a positive 
picture but one which, according to the Prime Minister, will be further improved 
‘[when] India’s plural and secular democracy [is] bolstered by her social and 
economic development and growth’. The impact of the domestic situation on 
India’s foreign policy has also been noted by the Prime Minister. ‘There cannot’, he 
has said, ‘be a disconnect between domestic capabilities, national aspirations, and 
external policies’ (quoted by Baru, 2013: 37 and 41). 
India’s involvement in global affairs has a long history and its contribution to 
multilateralism is well known. Once an acknowledged leader of the Non-Aligned 
Movement, with the decline in importance of the latter, India has seen its 
reputation as a spokesperson for ‘the South’ undergo a change. During the 
premierships of Indira and Rajiv Ghandi, the country lost its political ‘clout’ and 
                                                          
 31 ‘A Billion Brains’ (2012), Economist, 29 September, http://www.economist.com/node/21563418. 
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became a marginal player at the edges of the South Asia region. Today, by contrast, 
it ‘is . . . widely believed to be a potential economic superpower, a political 
counterweight to China, and a probable member of the UN Security Council’ 
(Tripathi 2011: 63–4). 
As India’s international role increases in size and prominence, there will be certain 
global-governance issues (such as nuclear non-proliferation and the international 
financial crisis) on which the country will be willing to cooperate and others which it 
will find more contentious. The Indian government continues to make known its 
displeasure at actions (such as NATO’s 2012 intervention in Libya) which impinge on 
national sovereignty. And as long as the industrialized countries refuse to assume 
responsibility for their share of environmentally damaging emissions, we cannot 
expect to see the debate on climate change driven forward by any strong show of 
commitment on the part of India. 
On the whole, India can be viewed as a constructive partner at the global-
governance level. With its pragmatic approach, and its acknowledged status as an 
emerging power, it is a respected participant in many multilateral forums. At the 
same time, its emphasis on strategic autonomy and its occasional insistence on its 
own uniqueness have earned it the reputation of a country that finds it difficult to 
compromise on global issues (as illustrated at the Doha trade talks and the 
negotiations on climate-change). The present Indian government engages in a 
variety of forms of interchange. These include classic multilateralism (at the UN 
and in other global forums), bilateral arrangements within its own neighbourhood 
and with strategic partners (such as the United States), and groupings such as the 
G20 and BRICS. This approach allows India to select the option that best accords 
with its interests (Debiel and Wulf 2013). When assessing India’s potential role in 
global cooperation, one must take care to work from the basic premise that 
(despite some domestic perceptions to this effect) Indian politics is not concerned 
to mimic the West or catch up with other countries, but is, rather, a genuinely 
endogenous process that seeks to blend the home-grown with the foreign. This 
diversity can be seen as an asset. 
In terms of global status, the Swiss Economics Institute’s 2013 KOF Index of 
Globalization ranks India 107th out of a total of 208 countries—not an especially 
good ranking for an emerging superpower or potential global player. In Kappel and 
Pohl’s listing (2013: 5), India occupies 65th place out of 100, far behind the other 
BRICS countries (China 16, South Africa 17, Brazil 23, and Russia 24). It fares a little 
better in the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, which places it 39th out of 128 on 
economic transformation and 21st out of 128 on political transformation 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012: 1). 
In conclusion: it seems that Indian society is in the process of reforming itself, but 
economically and socially there are still many problems to be addressed. 
Substantial structural reforms are required—not merely to banish the image of 
India as an underdeveloped country but also to bring about a genuine reduction in 
poverty and a significant lessening of social inequalities. Whatever deficiencies may 
persist, there is no doubt that India’s socio-cultural structures have proved resilient 
and adaptive across many centuries and that its social and political institutions 
provide a sound basis for an enhanced global role. The Indian government has built 
up an excellent reputation in the international political arena and its civilizational 
message has generally been positively received. 
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